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GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT
IX. Gideon v. Wainwright: A Lesson in the Obvious 31'
Hon. Judith S. Kaye
Gideon v. Wainwrights6 has always held special significance for
me because it was handed down the very week of my admission
to the Bar of the State of New York. At the time I considered it
a particularly thoughtful gesture on the part of the nine Justices
of the United States Supreme Court to extend this unanimous
welcome, and to assure me that I had chosen my livelihood well.
Lawyers, declared Justice Black, are "necessities, not
luxuries. 316
But the Gideon opinion, then as today, offered a brand new
lawyer many serious lessons about the importance of the right to
counsel, about the meaning of fairness and equal justice, and
about the judicial process itself. It was remarkable in 1963, as it
still is today, that a case that began with a habeas corpus peti-
tion written in pencil by an inmate at the Florida State Prison
could end by toppling a Supreme Court precedent of two de-
cades' standing and establishing a constitutional landmark that
continues to this day to inspire the most profound dialogue
about the fundamental nature of this nation's pledge of justice
for all.
Gideon is a case that speaks to everyone. You don't have to
be a lawyer to appreciate the plain good sense that motivated it.
Professor Yale Kamisar recently referred to Gideon v. Wain-
wright as "one of the most popular decisions ever handed down
by the United States Supreme Court." ' 7 I don't know whether
that is attributable more to Hugo Black or to the great talents of
Anthony Lewis. It is some mark of the enduring popularity of
314. This section of the conference was presented by the Hon. Judith Kaye -
LL.B., New York University, 1962. Upon graduating from law school, Judith Kaye was
an associate in the litigation department of Sullivan & Cromwell. She was associated
with the firm of Olwine, Connelly, Chase, O'Donnell & Weyher in their litigation depart-
ment from 1969-83 and became a partner in 1975. During her twenty-one years in pri-
vate practice, she was an active member of the New York bar. She was Director and then
Vice President of the Legal Aid Society from 1975-83. In 1983 she was appointed Associ-
ate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and currently holds this position.
315. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
316. Id. at 344.
317. Kamisar, The Gideon Case 25 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988 at A27,
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1990]
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
Gideon that only recently I was able to buy another copy of the
book Gideon's Trumpet at the SUNY-Albany campus book-
store, where it is required reading for the introductory political
science course, and a copy of the movie for ten dollars at a drug
store in the Colonie Mall, just outside Albany. And I don't know
whether that is attributable more to Anthony Lewis or to the
great talents of Henry Fonda.
Actually, every time I read the book or see the movie, as a
character I seem to favor Fred Turner even over Clarence
Gideon, or Abe Fortas, or the fabulous Velva Estelle Morris,
Gideon's loyal landlady (played in the movie by Fay Wray, King
Kong's friend). To be sure, Gideon, already a multiple loser, had
uncommon persistence and Abe Fortas, already a multiple win-
ner, had uncommon persuasiveness (as well as a lot of very good
help). But it was Fred Turner, the Panama City trial law-
yer - applying all the skills developed by advocates over years
in the trenches - who singlehandedly drove home the point
made by the Supreme Court in the Gideon opinion: that it is
essential to a fair trial that defendants have effective counsel.
Fred Turner actually proved in a way everyone can under-
stand that it's not just the rules of evidence and technical points
of criminal law that require the assistance of a law-
yer - though they surely do. He proved that you need a lawyer
as much for the obvious things about a case as the arcane points
of law. When Gideon at his first trial himself examined the oper-
ator of the Bay Harbor Poolroom - doing, in Justice Black's
words, "about as well as could be expected from a layman, ' -
he elicited testimony that some money, beer and wine had been
stolen, and he left it at that. But it was Fred Turner in Gideon's
second trial who picked up on that point and established exactly
what was missing from the Bay Harbor Poolroom - twelve
bottles of Coca-Cola, twelve cans of beer, four-fifths of wine and
about $65 in change. Then he examined the cab driver, Preston
Bray, who had driven Gideon downtown that fateful night:
Q: Did he have any wine on him?
A: No Sir.
Q: Any Beer?
318. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
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A: No Sir.
Q: Any Coca-Cola?
A: No Sir.
Q: Did his pockets bulge?
A: No Sir. 19
In summation Turner then asked the jury three pointed
questions:
What happened to the beer and the wine and the cokes? Mr.
Gideon carried one hundred dollars' worth of change in his
pocket? Do you believe that?" 320
Well, they didn't. Why, I've often wondered, didn't that obvious
point occur to anyone earlier? With Gideon having allegedly
been under surveillance at all times, what had become of the
proceeds of the theft? In his first trial, Gideon simply insisted
that he was innocent, he didn't do any breaking and entering.
That was the theme as well as the substance of his sterile exami-
nations of witnesses and arguments to the jury, and it got him
five years in state prison. He didn't know how to establish his
innocence, and the state didn't lift a finger to help him. It took
an experienced advocate dedicated to his client's interests to
fashion Gideon's protestations of innocence into a story for the
jury, a rationalization, a reasonable doubt that resulted in his
acquittal. Until Gideon had a lawyer, no one else in the justice
system had that function, or responsibility, or commitment.
If Fred Turner taught us the difficulty and importance of
seeing the obvious, so did Hugo Black. In his Gideon opinion
Justice Black expressed, simply and directly, the "obvious
truth,"3"' the high principle that was immediately plain to ev-
eryone: "[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice," he said,
"any person hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This noble ideal [of a fair trial] cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a law-
yer to assist him." 322 Indeed, looking at the simple good sense of
those words, it's hard to think that the law ever allowed
319. A. LEWIS, supra note 69, at 234.
320. Id. at 237.
321. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
322. Id.
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otherwise.
But Justice Black had struck that same blow for simple de-
cency in just about the same words twenty years earlier, when he
wrote that denial of the right to counsel in serious criminal cases
defeats "the promise of our democratic society to provide equal
justice under the law." Those words are taken from the dissent
in Betts v. Brady,323 where the Supreme Court ruled six to three
that the fourteenth amendment does not embody an inexorable
command that an accused be afforded counsel. In the view of
some, Betts v. Brady was outdated and wrong before the ink was
dry on the opinion. It must have been an exquisite pleasure for
Justice Black twenty years later in Gideon to announce for a
unanimous Supreme Court: We agree. 2 '
As to that judgment I prefer a perception made by Clarence
Gideon himself, in the extraordinary twenty-two page hand
printed letter he had sent to Abe Fortas at the outset of their
relationship. In Gideon's words, "each era finds an improvement
in law, each year brings something new for the benefit of man-
kind. Maybe this will be one of those small steps forward." '325
The Gideon case in 1963 represented exactly that sort of gradual
improvement, advancement, evolution in thinking, and that's
why - when the "obvious" was ultimately discovered by the
Supreme Court - the decision immediately enjoyed such popu-
larity among the legal profession, the press and the public. On
the one hand it took a long time - far too long-to come to
enlightenment. But on the other hand we did.
Today, twenty-six years after my own admission to the bar,
I have the privilege of viewing Gideon v. Wainwright from a dif-
ferent perspective - that of a state court judge. While I would
agree that there have been some deeply disturbing developments
in the law in the intervening years, it is also true that there has
been some improvement. Rather than focus on Gideon lost, or
betrayed, or questioned, or unfulfilled - and it is in a sense at
least all of those - I want to spend a moment on something
more positive.
In the 1960s it was hardly surprising that, having been de-
323. 316 U.S. 455, 474 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
324. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
325. A. LEWIS, supra note 69, at 78.
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nied counsel by the Florida state courts, Clarence Earl Gideon
should have sought and obtained justice from the United States
Supreme Court. Ralph Abernathy said it in the 1950s: "God
spoke from the federal court."3 ' So did Monrad Paulsen when
he said: "[I]f our liberties are not protected in Des Moines, the
only hope is in Washington." '27 The federal courts for decades
have functioned as the fount of individual rights and liberties.
In our system of federalism, as Justice Harlan noted in his
Gideon concurrence, the state courts were the ones "charged
with the front-line responsibility for the enforcement of consti-
tutional rights."3 8 But it had become painfully apparent by the
1950s that many state courts were failing in that front-line re-
sponsibility. By the time Gideon's decade ended, the Supreme
Court had incorporated large portions of the Bill of Rights into
the fourteenth amendment and applied them to the states. The
Supreme Court in those years busily raised, widened and remade
the federal constitutional floor, which then was accepted by
states as their state constitutional ceiling. The Supreme Court
had become the touchstone for all constitutional decision-mak-
ing concerning individual rights. For those of us educated and
trained as lawyers in these years, resort to the federal courts
grew to be instinctive in matters of constitutional right, as it re-
mains for many today.
Of course the state courts have long contributed to shaping
national constitutional law. In Betts, for example, when the Su-
preme Court asked itself whether the furnishing of counsel in all
cases was dictated by fundamental principles of fairness, it
looked to state practice for that answer.32 e The Supreme Court
undertook a thorough review of common law and constitutional
law within each of the states, and based upon its perceptions of
state law, held that "the considered judgment of the people,
their representatives and their courts [was] that appointment of
326. A. LUKAS, COMMON GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVES OF THREE
AMERICAN FAMILIES 22 (Vintage ed. 1986) (quoting Abernathy).
327. Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1081, 1084 (1985) (quoting Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First
Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 640 (1951).
328. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
329. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial. 3 0
Twenty years later the Court in Gideon said that conclusion was
dead wrong. In the Gideon opinion Justice Black noted as well
that "twenty-two states, as amici curiae, "or friends of the
court," had agreed that Betts was an "anachronism" even when
the Supreme Court handed it down. ' 331 Some friends.
We have so many more recent examples of the influence of
state courts on the development of national law - like Mapp v.
Ohio,33 2 where the Supreme Court changed direction and ap-
plied the exclusionary rule nationally, noting that since its own
prior decision declining to do so, two-thirds of the states had
themselves adopted it. And in Batson v. Kentucky333 the Su-
preme Court reversed its earlier ruling on the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges, basically adopting procedures in use
in several states. A similar process is under way right now, as
Gates,13' Leon,335 Strickland336 and other recent decisions of the
Supreme Court are tested in the state court laboratories.
State courts throughout the country recently have also be-
come more aggressive participants in the process of defining and
protecting individual rights. It's a fine thing for state courts to
serve as laboratories and reference points for the United States
Supreme Court in fashioning national constitutional rights. But
they also can independently write their own material under state
constitutions. Every state has one, and every judge and lawyer
takes an oath to uphold it. As my friend Judge Marie Garibaldi
recently wrote for the New Jersey Supreme Court: "That the
United States Supreme Court has overruled Swain in Batson
does not mean that the laboratories operated by leading state
courts should close up shop .... Batson is not the final word in
this area. '33 7 In New Jersey and in many other states, now the
state supreme courts have asserted themselves as the final word
in the area under their own state constitutions. All sorts of
330. Id. at 471.
331. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
332. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
333. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
334. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
335. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
336. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
337. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 522, 511 A.2d 1150, 1157 (1986).
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grounds have been advanced in support of state law decisions
affording greater individual rights under state constitutions than
Supreme Court holdings under the federal charter.
Whatever the precise catalyst - whether the Supreme
Court's retreat from earlier decisions, or the explicit green light
it gave to the states for development of state jurisprudence, or
the infectious activity of sister states, or the writings and expec-
tations of litigants and commentators, or all of these and
more - in matters of individual rights state courts seem in-
creasingly to be turning to their own state constitutions as the
dispositive ground for their decisions, which may then be im-
mune from further review. We now see not only decisions, but
also symposiums, textbooks, law school courses devoted to the
subject of state constitutional law. These days when a state
court considers whether to follow or reject a Supreme Court pre-
cedent, or when it reconsiders a case on remand from the United
States Supreme Court, it's a real event with by no means a fore-
ordained result.
So I think we rightly mark as one recent advance in the law
the more visible assertion of state courts throughout the nation
as front-line enforcers of state constitutional rights.
A quarter of a century after Gideon, another truth has
emerged as obvious. What was in 1963 such an eipression of
common sense decency that the public could immediately recog-
nize and applaud it, has with time become clouded. We may still
refer to the noble ideal that every defendant stands equal before
the law, but in fact we have reconciled ourselves to standing
short of achieving it. Ironically, with society and the law moving
briskly toward a new century, there may well even be greater
imbalances and distances between individuals like Clarence
Gideon and acquittals after trial with effective counsel at de-
fendants' side. The law grows increasingly sophisticated as pub-
lic dedication to the principle of equal justice seems to dwindle.
So what's to celebrate, you ask. We can celebrate the fact
that the spark of Gideon is still alive and undoubtedly will be
kept alive by marking each anniversary, by collective and indi-
vidual efforts to give meaning to its message, by courses that
teach the "obvious truth" of Gideon. If the battle seems dis-
heartening today, think what the odds must have looked like to
Clarence Earl Gideon. Yet as Gideon's Trumpet describes, even
1990]
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as a five-time loser facing five years in the penitentiary a flame
still burned in him. "He had not given up caring about life or
freedom; he had not lost his sense of injustice." 8'
After the Supreme Court decision, a newspaper reporter
asked Gideon, "Do you feel like you accomplished something?"
He responded, "Well, I did. '3 9
Of course he did. He did and we will.
338. A. LEwis, supra note 69, at 6.
339. Id. at 238.
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